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One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of 
the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and 
Suggestions for Increased Participation and 
Future Compliance 
Stephan Michael Brown* 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the most recent estimate in 2006, the tax gap, 
defined as “the amount of tax liability faced by taxpayers that is 
not paid on time,”1 was $450 billion,2 with an estimated $100 
billion resulting from unreported international income annually.3 
Perhaps not coincidentally, in 2002, the foreign bank account 
reporting (hereinafter “FBAR”) compliance rate was estimated to 
be potentially less than 20%.4 In response, the government has 
drastically increased the penalties for noncompliance,5 and the 
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter “IRS”) has introduced a 
series of pseudo-amnesty programs.6 The recent Offshore 
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Chapman Law Review for their time and commitment to the editing process. Finally, I 
would like to thank my wife, Eva Brown, for her continued love and support throughout 
law school, particularly while working on this paper. 
 1 Internal Revenue Serv., The Tax Gap, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-
Gap (last updated Dec. 3, 2013). 
 2 See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Gap “Map”, IRS.GOV., (Dec. 2011), http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.  
 3 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON 
TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print 2008); see also Susan C. 
Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. 
REV. 675, 701 n.92 (2012) (providing several estimates ranging from $50 billion to $255 
billion annually). 
 4 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b) 
OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS 
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/ReportToCongress361.PDF. A perfectly accurate 
compliance rate would have been difficult to determine due to the limited amount of 
available information. However, this approximation is based on the Service’s estimate 
from the limited information it did have. Id. 
 5 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C) (2012). 
 6 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-news/ir-03-05.pdf (announcing the 2003 Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative); 
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Voluntary Disclosure (hereinafter “OVD”) programs have been 
instrumental in increased compliance for FBAR and reporting of 
worldwide income.7 Although the programs have been considered 
successful,8 there are still a large number of taxpayers who 
remain noncompliant with respect to reporting their foreign 
income and assets.9  
This Article will offer suggestions to improve the current 
OVD program which will further the purposes of increased 
compliance and revenue collection.10 Part I will provide a history 
of FBAR, including the events leading to increased penalties for 
noncompliance and the introduction of the first OVD program in 
2003. Part II will establish the reemergence of the 
pseudo-amnesty OVD programs in 2009 and 2011, as well as the 
quiet disclosure and opt-out alternatives to voluntary disclosure. 
Part III will evaluate the meaning of “willfulness” in the context 
of FBAR penalties by detailing recent developments in case law, 
and will discuss the resulting uncertainties in the context of the 
OVD program. Part IV will explore the continuation of the OVD 
program in its current state, including an analysis of problems 
with the program.  
 
Internal Revenue Serv., Statement from IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman on Offshore 
Income, IRS.GOV (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Statement-from-IRS-Commiss 
ioner-Doug-Shulman-on-Offshore-Income (announcing the 2009 Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative); I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-84 (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Reminds-Taxpayers-that-the-Aug.-31-Deadline-Is-Fast-Approaching 
-for-the-Second-Special-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-of-Offshore-Accounts (announcing 
the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program); I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4- 
Billion-To-Date-for-Nation’s-Taxpayers;-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Reopens 
(announcing the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program). 
 7 See Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle 
Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 526 (2012). 
 8 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/uac/IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-Details-on-the-Vol 
untary-Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole (quoting IRS Commissioner 
Doug Shulman, who stated that the IRS “‘continue[d] to make strong progress in our 
international compliance efforts that help ensure honest taxpayers are not footing the bill 
for those hiding assets offshore’”). 
 9 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 134 (2012) 
(“While an estimated five to seven million U.S. citizens reside abroad, and many more 
U.S. residents have FBAR filing requirements, the IRS received only 741,249 FBAR 
filings in 2011, and as of September 29, 2012, it had received fewer than 28,000 OVD 
submissions from FBAR violators. Thus, significant FBAR filing compliance problems 
likely remain unaddressed.”). 
 10 See Internal Revenue Serv., Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently 
Asked Questions and Answers, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-
Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Ans 
wers (last updated Aug. 26, 2013) (stating that the objective of the program is “to bring 
taxpayers that have used undisclosed foreign accounts and undisclosed foreign entities to 
avoid or evade tax into compliance with United States tax laws”).  
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This Article will conclude that in order to further increase 
compliance, the OVD program should eliminate the 
one-size-fits-all approach by expanding the current penalty 
structure with the goal of drastically increasing participation. 
The program should be given an end date, and it should coincide 
with public prosecutions of the most egregious offenders. Doing 
so will give taxpayers who have not yet come forward to disclose 
their foreign accounts a great incentive to do so by reducing the 
penalty for past actions. The result will be a huge boost to 
current and future tax revenues. Alternatively, if the program is 
not expanded, the majority of taxpayers who have not yet come 
forward will likely continue to hide their assets offshore and the 
international tax gap will continue to be astoundingly large, 
putting a strain on compliant taxpayers. 
I. HISTORY OF FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT REPORTING AND 
PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
The FBAR requirement was initially established by the 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, 
commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act, part of which is 
codified in Title 31 of the United States Code.11 The purpose of 
the requirement was to obtain data with “a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings.”12 In 2001, the Patriot Act13 expanded the purpose to 
include protecting against international terrorism.14 The Patriot 
Act amendment made the reporting requirements of Title 31 
more of a priority, with one commentator noting, “Nowadays, 
once something has been labeled as crucial to the ubiquitous ‘war 
on terror,’ there seem to be few (if any) limits on governmental 
efforts.”15 
Section 5314(a) of the Patriot Act provides that  
the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a resident or citizen of 
the United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United 
States, to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports, 
when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction or 
 
 11 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314 (2012); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Bank 
Secrecy Act, FINCEN.GOV, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2014).  
 12 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment). 
 13 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012)). 
 14 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (adding “or in the conduct of intelligence or 
counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against international 
terrorism”). 
 15 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and 
Why It Matters, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 3 (2006). 
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maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial 
agency.16  
The Code then states that the “records and reports shall 
contain . . . information in the way and to the extent the 
Secretary prescribes.”17 Under this authority, the Secretary of 
the Treasury developed Form TD F 90-22.1 “Report of Foreign 
Bank and Financial Accounts,”18 commonly referred to as Foreign 
Bank Account Reporting, or FBAR, which has recently been 
replaced by FinCEN Form 114.19 The Form requires reporting of 
the maximum value of all foreign accounts exceeding $10,000 at 
any time during the calendar year.20  
Prior to 2004, the Secretary of the Treasury could have 
imposed a civil monetary penalty on any person “willfully 
violat[ing]” the FBAR requirement.21 According to the Supreme 
Court in Cheek v. United States, “[w]illfulness . . . require[d] the 
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the 
defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he 
voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.”22 Furthermore, 
“carrying this burden require[d] negating a defendant’s claim of 
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a 
misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he 
was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.”23 
Although willfulness required such a high evidentiary standard, 
if proven, the Secretary could have imposed monetary civil 
penalties, ranging from $25,000 up to the balance in the account 
at the time of the violation, whichever was greater, with a 
maximum penalty of $100,000 for each violation.24 In addition to 
the civil penalty provision, any person found willfully violating 
 
 16 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a). 
 17 Id. 
 18 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM TD F 90-22.1, REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (2012) [hereinafter FORM TD F 90-22.1], available at www.fin 
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-1_fbar.pdf. 
 19 Internal Revenue Serv., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (last updated Jan. 
24, 2014). 
 20 See FORM TD F 90-22.1, supra note 18, at 6; see also FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT 
NETWORK, BSA ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (FINCEN FORM 114) 4 (2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
forms/files/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instructions.pdf. 
 21 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment). 
 22 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). 
 23 Id. at 202. Although this case was regarding the FBAR civil penalty under Title 
31, the Court opted to use the term “tax laws.” Several courts and commentators use 
terms such as “tax laws” and “taxpayers” when referring to the FBAR penalty. See, e.g., 
United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride, 
908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012); Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10. Due to the 
nature of the OVD programs, this Article will do the same. 
 24 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment). 
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the FBAR requirement could have been subject to a criminal 
penalty of up to $250,000, or up to five years in prison, or both.25 
Section 361(b) of the Patriot Act requires annual reports to 
Congress as follows:  
The Secretary of the Treasury shall study methods for improving 
compliance with the reporting requirements established in section 
5314 of title 31, United States Code, and shall submit a report on such 
study to the Congress by the end of the 6-month period beginning on 
the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 26, 2001] and each 1-year 
period thereafter. The initial report shall include historical data on 
compliance with such reporting requirements.26  
The initial report, given in April 2002,27 estimated that FBAR 
compliance was potentially below 20%.28 The report also 
indicated that enforcement was virtually nonexistent.29 Some of 
the reasons cited for the lack of enforcement included difficulty in 
obtaining evidence of undisclosed foreign financial accounts,30 the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s preference to charge taxpayers with 
other violations (typically illegal conduct such as tax evasion, 
fraud, or money laundering),31 and the difficulty prosecutors had 
in demonstrating willfulness for civil penalties.32  
The report gave recommendations for improving compliance 
with FBAR reporting requirements, and provided the IRS and 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (hereinafter 
“FinCEN”)33 with five objectives for the following year: update 
and improve the FBAR form and instructions, review filing and 
processing procedures, enhance outreach and education to tax 
practitioners, establish a joint task force on prosecutions and 
enforcement, and consider delegating penalty authority from 
FinCEN to the IRS.34 Additionally, although the report 
 
 25 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012). 
 26 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 361(b), 115 Stat. 272, 332. 
 27 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4. 
 28 Id. at 6. 
 29 Id. at 8 (“Between 1996 and 1998, Justice Department statistics reveal that only 
nine indictments were filed charging 31 U.S.C. 5314; in 1999 and 2000, no one appears to 
have been charged. The Customs Service reports only three convictions since 1995.”); see 
also id. at 9 (reporting only twelve referrals for civil enforcement since 1993, only two of 
which were assessed monetary penalties). 
 30 Id. at 8. 
 31 Id. at 9. 
 32 Id. at 10. 
 33 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network was established in 1990 as a bureau 
of the Department of the Treasury and was tasked with enforcing the FBAR provisions 
under Chapter 53 of Title 31, among other things. See 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012). 
 34 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
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recognized that uninformed taxpayers35 would benefit from 
education and outreach,36 it found that this would not increase 
compliance for “taxpayers who fail to file because they are 
concealing income or are engaged in some kind of criminal 
activity.”37 For this group, the report suggested deterrence 
through “a series of highly publicized criminal actions against 
intentional violators in order to raise the cost of being an FBAR 
scofflaw.”38 
In April 2003, the second report was presented, the bulk of 
which detailed the progress made on the objectives from the 
initial report.39 In an agreement reached weeks before the second 
report was issued, FinCEN delegated its authority to enforce 
FBAR provisions to the IRS.40 The IRS also took over the 
responsibility of updating and improving the FBAR form and 
instructions; however, no such updates or improvements were 
made and no new target date was given for this goal.41 The IRS 
also assumed the responsibility of reviewing filing and processing 
procedures of the FBAR forms,42 and began taking steps to 
improve outreach and education such as utilizing media outlets 
and working with tax practitioner organizations.43 Lastly, a joint 
task force was formed between the IRS, FinCEN, and the 
Department of Justice to enhance prosecutions and enforcement, 
which included the IRS’s 2003 Offshore Voluntary Compliance 
Initiative (hereinafter “OVCI”).44 The second report concluded 
with goals for the following year: emphasize examination of 
offshore activities, identify potential non-filers, continue outreach 
and education, and use input from filers to improve the FBAR 
form.45 
The 2003 OVCI was the first program administered by the 
IRS designed to allow taxpayers with “offshore financial 
arrangements” to voluntarily come forward and “clear up their 
 
 35 Common scenarios in which taxpayers may be unwittingly subject to the FBAR 
rules include students studying abroad, taxpayers with temporary offshore work 
assignments, individuals with inherited foreign accounts, and immigrants. See Sheppard, 
supra note 15, at 26–27. 
 36 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 37 Id. at 11. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b) 
OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS 
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fbar3613.pdf. 
 40 Id. at 4–5. 
 41 Id. at 5. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 5–6. 
 44 Id. at 6–7. 
 45 Id. at 7–8. 
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tax liabilities.”46 The program came on the heels of an Offshore 
Credit Card Program that included credit card summonses in 
2000 and 2002 meant to find offshore tax evaders.47 The purpose 
was to quickly bring taxpayers back into compliance and to 
simultaneously gather information about promoters of offshore 
schemes.48 Essentially, the initiative was a pseudo-amnesty 
program allowing taxpayers to voluntarily amend their tax 
returns to include offshore income in exchange for a waiver of 
certain penalties and a guarantee of no criminal prosecution.49 
According to a July 2003 IRS News Release, the program brought 
in $75 million in taxes, at a cost of approximately $2 million.50 
These results were not without controversy however, with one 
report suggesting that only $3.3 million had been assessed at a 
cost of an estimated $56 million.51 Although the success may 
have been limited, the IRS did identify over 400 offshore 
promoters, about half of which were previously unknown to the 
IRS.52  
In April 2005, a third report was presented,53 ingeniously 
referred to as the third annual report.54 This report detailed the 
progress made on the objectives from the prior two periods, 
including reiterating and at times expanding on the second 
report.55 One noteworthy point included in the third annual 
report was a list of several problems identified with the current 
FBAR form, leading to the uninspired conclusion that the IRS 
would concentrate on the instructions, “leaving material revision 
of the form itself to another day.”56 Also of note, the report 
 
 46 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5, supra note 6, at 1. 
 47 Id. at 2. 
 48 Id. at 1. 
 49 Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311. 
 50 I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-95 (July 30, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-news/ir-03-95.pdf. 
 51 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 507. Such results lead one to question government 
accounting methods. If a taxpayer’s calculations resulted in such a discrepancy, it would 
be deemed fraudulent. 
 52 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-95, supra note 50.  
 53 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b) OF 
THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED 
TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) (2005) (listing 
the year 2004 in the web address even though the report was presented in 2005). One 
point of interest is the date is that not included on the cover page as in the prior two 
reports, perhaps because the report came a year later than that mandated by law under 
the Patriot Act. Furthermore, this is the last report to Congress despite the continuing 
requirement for annual reports. 
 54 Id. at 3. 
 55 Id. at 5–11. 
 56 Id. at 6–8. The Form and Instructions were eventually updated in 2008. See Philip 
T. Pasmanik & Neil A. J. Sullivan, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial 
Accounts: Significant Revisions and Severe Penalties, J. ACCT. (July 2009), 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/TTAFBARReport.htm. 
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showed a 17% increase in FBAR filings from 2000 to 2003, 
believed to be in significant part from the 2003 OVCI.57 
Overall, these reports convinced Congress that FBAR 
compliance was unsatisfactory, and several bills were introduced 
to address the problem.58 Eventually, on October 22, 2004, the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 200459 was passed, part of which 
gave section 5321 a major overhaul.  
Following this overhaul, a revised section 5321(a)(5)(C) 
increased the penalty for a person who willfully violates the 
FBAR requirement to the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the 
account balance, with no ceiling.60 As one commentator noted, 
“Given the astronomical balance in some unreported accounts, 
and the fact that the IRS often applies the penalty on a 
per-account-per-year basis, the penalties can be enormous.”61 
Under section 5321(a)(5)(A), the Secretary of the Treasury was 
given discretion to impose a penalty of up to $10,000 for 
non-willful violations,62 though an exception for “reasonable 
cause” is provided if “the amount of the transaction or the 
balance in the account at the time of the transaction was 
properly reported.”63 The criminal penalties remain unchanged 
following this overhaul.64 
II. 2009 AND 2011 OVD PROGRAMS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Six years passed before the successor to OVCI, the 2009 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (hereinafter “OVDP”), 
was put in place.65 This program ran in conjunction with a 
 
 57 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 11.  
 58 See Sheppard, supra note 15, at 17 n.101. 
 59 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
 60 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C) (2012).  
 61 See Hale E. Sheppard, Third Time’s the Charm: Government Finally Collects 
‘Willful’ FBAR Penalty in Williams, 117 J. TAX’N 319, 320 (2012); see also NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 147 (“Because the statute of limitations period is six years, 
the maximum penalty for large accounts is essentially 300 percent of the maximum 
account balances (assuming a relatively constant balance).”).  
 62 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A)–(B)(i). The IRS has taken the aggressive position that 
the non-willful penalty can be applied on a per-account, per-year basis; however, this 
issue has not yet been litigated. Internal Revenue Serv., Internal Revenue Manual 
4.26.16.4, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, IRS.GOV (July 1, 2008), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-026-016.html. 
 63 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii)(II). 
 64 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a). 
 65 See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, Deputy IRS Comm’r for Servs. and 
Enforcement, to Comm’r, Large and Mid-Size Bus. Div. and Comm’r, Small 
Bus./Self-Employed Div. (Mar. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff], 
available at http://hodgen.com/irs-amnesty-offshore-account/; see also Internal Revenue 
Serv., supra note 6. 
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crackdown on offshore tax evasion66—which  focused on the 
international banking giant UBS—that began when a 
disgruntled employee revealed that “he was part of a UBS team 
that made frequent trips across the Atlantic to aggressively 
market investment strategies to rich Americans to elude the 
scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service.”67 In the summer of 
2008, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a John Doe 
Summons asking UBS to disclose the names of all of its U.S. 
clients, representing “the first time that the United States ha[d] 
attempted to pierce Swiss bank secrecy by compelling a Swiss 
bank to name its U.S. clients.”68 This led to an agreement by UBS 
to pay a $780 million penalty and release the names of 250 
Americans.69  
The Department of Justice was not satisfied, however, and in 
February 2009 “filed another civil lawsuit against UBS seeking 
the identities of 52,000 more Americans suspected of stashing a 
total of $15 billion at the bank.”70 Following an agreement 
between the United States and Swiss governments, a settlement 
was reached in the case, with UBS agreeing to supply the names 
of close to 4450 American account holders the IRS suspected of 
evading taxes.71 Specific details of the agreement were not 
released until after the completion of the 2009 OVDP, which 
brought in more than 15,000 taxpayers, many more than the 
1000 taxpayers the IRS expected would participate.72 
The 2009 OVDP required taxpayers to amend or file six 
years of tax returns and FBARs, and pay any resulting increase 
in tax with interest.73 Taxpayers were assessed either an 
accuracy or delinquency penalty for all six years, with no 
possibility for a reasonable cause exception.74 Additionally, in 
lieu of all other penalties, including the statutory FBAR 
 
 66 The timing of the 2009 program was intended to capitalize on the publicity of the 
scandal. See Lederman, supra note 7, at 510 (“The 2009 initiative was timed to profit from 
the publicity about Birkenfield and UBS . . . .”). 
 67 Graham Bowley, A Privileged World Begins to Give Up Its Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2009, at WK3.  
 68 Jared Seff, Cracking Down on Tax Evaders—Swiss Banking: Secrets, Lies, and 
Deception, 38 S.U. L. REV. 159, 162 (2010). 
 69 Id. at 162–63. 
 70 Id. at 164. 
 71 Id. At 164–65. Although the results of the agreement have led to increased 
disclosure by many Americans, some members of Congress were not appeased. As 
Michigan Senator Carl Levin stated, “[T]he tortured wording and the many limitations in 
this Annex shows the Swiss Government trying to preserve as much bank secrecy as it 
can for the future, while pushing to conceal the names of tens of thousands of suspected 
U.S. tax cheats. It is disappointing that the U.S. government went along.” Id. at 172. 
 72 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 510. 
 73 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 6. 
 74 See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, supra note 65, at 2.  
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penalties, participants in the program had to pay a penalty equal 
to 20% of the amount in foreign accounts in the year with the 
highest aggregate balance during the six-year period.75 The IRS 
warned that taxpayers who do not come forward through the 
program could be subject to additional penalties, with agents 
instructed to pursue “both civil and criminal avenues, and 
consider all available penalties including the maximum penalty 
for the willful failure to file the FBAR report and the fraud 
penalty.”76 The IRS considered the program a resounding 
success, boasting an estimated $3.4 billion of tax revenue.77  
Although the IRS considered the 2009 OVDP as highly 
effective, some taxpayers chose to go outside of the program and 
make a “quiet disclosure”78 by simply amending their returns to 
include any foreign income and paying the resulting tax. A quiet 
disclosure was seen by taxpayers as a safe substitute to get 
around the severe penalties imposed through the OVDP.79 The 
IRS, on the other hand, saw it as undermining the credibility of a 
program that was otherwise proving a success.80 The government 
discouraged the practice, therefore, by reminding those opting to 
make a quiet disclosure that they were risking criminal 
prosecution, relief from which was only possible by open 
participation in the program.81 Despite this, there has not been a 
widely publicized case of significant penalties being assessed 
after a quiet disclosure. Therefore, the public’s perception may be 
that circumventing the program to avoid penalties is a viable 
option.82  
 
 75 Id. There was a narrow exception to reduce the penalty to 5% if the taxpayer did 
not open the foreign accounts, there was no activity in the accounts, and all U.S. taxes 
had been paid on the funds in the accounts, with only account earnings escaping taxation.  
Id. 
 76 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 6. 
 77 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6. Following the program, the IRS 
combed through the data received and continued to prosecute UBS clients. See Lederman, 
supra note 7, at 511. As another strategy to curb offshore tax evasion, in 2010 Congress 
enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) as part of the Hiring 
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, requiring additional foreign asset 
reporting on U.S. tax returns while creating some overlap with existing FBAR 
requirements. Id. at 512. FATCA also imposes information-sharing obligations on foreign 
banks, incentivized by a 30% withholding on United States-sourced payments against 
institutions that do not comply. Id. 
 78 See Internal Revenue Serv., Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, 
IRS.GOV, Q&A 10 (May 6, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questions-
and-Answers. 
 79 See Morse, supra note 3, at 720–21. 
 80 Id. at 721. 
 81 Id. at 722. 
 82 Id. The closest the government has come to such a prosecution occurred in August  
of 2011, after a taxpayer made a quiet disclosure by amending his returns and submitting 
FBARs. Although he was in compliance in those regards, he left off significant income 
from a partnership on both the original returns and the amended ones. See Jeremy 
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Following the success of the 2009 OVDP, on February 8, 
2011, the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (2011 
OVDI) was introduced.83 The program was similar to the 2009 
OVDP, with three key differences: the look-back period was 
extended to eight years,84 the penalty imposed on the highest 
aggregate offshore account balances was increased from 20% to 
25%—although some taxpayers may qualify for a reduced 
penalty of 5% or 12.5% in certain narrow circumstances85—and, 
to help combat quiet disclosures, the program provided 
participants with an option to opt out of the penalty.86 
Opting out of the civil settlement structure alternative 
allows taxpayers who do not agree with the flat penalty under 
the program to opt out of the penalty.87 However, taxpayers 
choosing to opt out are subjected to a complete examination.88 
The examiner will determine whether willfulness exists, and no 
penalty will be assessed if the IRS deems that the failure to file 
was due to reasonable cause.89 While participation in the 
program comes with a recommendation not to prosecute for 
violations up to the date of the disclosure,90 participants who opt 
out “could be referred to Criminal Investigation for investigation 
and possible prosecution and assertion of the civil fraud 
penalty.”91 Without any type of assurances, it is not a surprise 
 
Pelofsky, Bank Executive to Plead Guilty to Hiding Account, REUTERS, May 19, 2011, 
available at https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2ed6a540956511e19fefb85885c303b5/ 
View/FullText.html. The question remains whether the government will prosecute a 
taxpayer making a quiet disclosure that is complete and accurate. See Remy Farag, HSBC 
Client Prosecuted After Quiet Disclosure, J. INT’L TAX’N, Aug. 2011, at 8, 9. The IRS says 
they will be on the lookout for taxpayers making quiet disclosures and look to penalize 
and perhaps prosecute. See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10, at FAQ 15–16. The 
reality of that threat remains questionable. See Randall P. Andreozzi & Arlene M. 
Hibschweiler, FBAR: Handle With Care, 43 TAX ADVISER 330, 335 (2012) (“Since Schiavo 
involves an incomplete quiet disclosure, whether the IRS will treat complete and accurate 
quiet disclosures similarly remains unclear.”). 
 83 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-84, supra note 6. 
 84 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 515. The look-back period was extended so OVD 
participants “did not get a ‘pass’ with respect to the 2003 and 2004 tax years.” Id. 
 85 Id. at 516. The circumstances necessary for the 5% penalty were similar to the 
requirements under the 2009 OVDP, see supra note 75, except that instead of no account 
activity being allowed, there must have been less than $1000 withdrawn per year. See 
Internal Revenue Serv., 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked 
Questions, IRS.GOV, FAQ 52, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/ 
2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers 
(last updated Jan. 24, 2014). In order to qualify for the 12.5% penalty, the highest 
aggregate balance during the look-back period must have been less than $75,000. Id. at 
FAQ 53.  
 86 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 516. 
 87 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 85, at FAQ 51. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at FAQ 51.1. 
 90 Id. at FAQ 51.3. 
 91 Id.  
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that less than 1% of program participants have opted out since it 
has become an option.92 As a recent report by the National 
Taxpayer Advocate noted,  
even where taxpayers feel strongly that their FBAR noncompliance 
was due to reasonable cause or was not willful, faced with the choice 
of accepting the IRS’s proposed penalty . . . or opting for a full 
examination — with the hope of avoiding the penalty . . . of far more 
than their net worth . . . — many will not want to risk opting out.93  
The IRS reported that it had received a total of 33,000 
voluntary disclosures under the 2009 and 2011 programs 
combined, and collected $4.4 billion.94 However, at the time of 
these two OVD programs, taxpayers and tax practitioners alike 
were just becoming aware of the FBAR requirements, so many of 
the OVD participants would not have been subject to the civil 
penalty for willfulness for the tax years at issue.95 Even so, the 
IRS opted to impose a penalty that is an excellent deal for willful 
violators, but a terrible option for non-willful violators.96 
Unfortunately, many taxpayers entering the program succumbed 
to the fear tactics of the IRS and agreed to pay a penalty through 
the OVD program that is greater than the penalty that would 
have otherwise been assessed, if any.97 
III. WILLFULNESS: THE WILLIAMS TRILOGY AND THE CURRENT 
STATE OF UNCERTAINTY 
As discussed in Part II above, under the old law, imposing 
the FBAR penalty required a high evidentiary standard due to 
the willfulness requirement.98 This resulted in a serious lack of 
prosecutions under the old regime.99 More recently, however, a 
trilogy of cases culminating in the Fourth Circuit as United 
States v. Williams100 has left tax practitioners with considerable 
 
 92 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 138 (depicting 30 out of 11,941 
participants electing to opt out of the 2011 program, with only 8 of those cases closed as of 
September 29, 2012, one year after the close of the 2011 program). 
 93 Id. at 149. 
 94 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6. 
 95 See Morse, supra note 3, at 715 (“It is conceivable, given the historic lack of 
publicity about, and enforcement of, the FBAR filing requirements, that a defendant 
might be able to show a lack of willfulness.”). 
 96 See id. at 714 (“[The government] used twenty percent . . . and twenty-five 
percent . . . as the price for entering the voluntary disclosure program. This represents a 
discount from the statutory civil willfulness penalty of fifty percent of the account balance 
for each annual failure to file.”). 
 97 See id. at 715–16. 
 98 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). 
 99 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4. 
 100 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 319 (“The Williams trilogy has been a long road, 
with stops in the U.S. Tax Court (131 TC 54 (2008); ‘Williams I’), the U.S. district court 
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uncertainty as to what is required to establish willfulness with 
respect to FBAR violations.101 In these cases, the taxpayer was 
an attorney who, after graduating from NYU, worked in the 
corporate finance department of a major international law 
firm.102 He then obtained employment at Mobil Oil Corporation, 
where he worked in various legal and business positions, 
including, in 1991, exploring business opportunities for Mobil in 
the newly opened Russian markets.103 Two years later, he created 
a British Virgin Islands corporation, ALQI Holdings, Ltd., and 
opened up two bank accounts in the corporation’s name for 
holding the funds he received from foreign sources.104 From 1993 
to 2000, Williams deposited more than $7 million into these 
accounts, which generated more than $800,000 of interest and 
investment income.105 With respect to these foreign accounts, 
Williams had three duties: report the foreign income on his tax 
returns, check “yes” on Schedule B of his tax return to indicate 
that he has one or more foreign accounts,106 and file an FBAR.107 
He violated all three of these duties.108 
Beginning in 2000, Williams came under scrutiny by the 
IRS, which eventually led to guilty pleas in 2003 on one count of 
criminal tax evasion and one count of criminal conspiracy to 
defraud the government.109 At his sentencing in September 2003, 
the court imposed a punishment of forty-six months in jail, a 
$25,000 fine, restitution of over $3.5 million, and three years of 
supervised release.110 
Williams’s troubles were not over yet, as the IRS initiated a 
civil examination of his finances following the criminal 
 
(106 AFTR2d 2010-6150 (2010); ‘Williams II’), and, most recently, the Fourth Circuit in 
Williams III.”).  
 101 See id. (“[Williams III], already the subject of much criticism by the tax 
community, raises more questions than answers.”). 
 102 See id. at 320. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1040, SCHEDULE B—INTEREST AND ORDINARY 
DIVIDENDS (2000), available at http://www.irs. gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sab--2000.pdf. Line 
7a asks: “At any time during 2000, did you have an interest in or a signature or other 
authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities 
account, or other financial account?” Id. It then instructs the taxpayer to “[s]ee page B-2 
for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD F 90-22.1.” Id. The government 
argues that this instruction is enough to establish knowledge of the FBAR requirement. 
See United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-cv-437, 2010 WL 3473311, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 
2010).  
 107 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 320. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 321. 
 110 Id. at 322. 
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sentencing.111 In January 2007, the revenue agent asked him to 
file an FBAR for 2000, which Williams later claimed was the first 
time he had heard of the requirement.112 Thereafter, the IRS 
issued a notice of deficiency, assessing significant increases to 
Williams’s income tax liabilities for the tax years 1993 through 
2000, as well as penalties for negligence and civil fraud.113 
Additionally, the revenue agent assessed a civil FBAR penalty for 
2000,114 charging Williams the then-maximum penalty of 
$100,000 for each account.115 
Following these assessments, Williams petitioned the Tax 
Court, contesting all of the proposed deficiencies as well as the 
FBAR penalties.116 The Tax Court determined that it only has 
authority to review determinations of taxes imposed by Title 26, 
concluding that “the [FBAR] penalty . . . falls outside our 
jurisdiction to review deficiency determinations.”117  
Williams never paid the FBAR penalty, so in April 2009 the 
government filed a complaint in district court in order to 
collect.118 Due to Williams’s checking “No” on Schedule B in 
response to having any foreign bank accounts, the government 
argued that his “signature on his Form 1040 is prima facie 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. Generally, the statute of limitations for income tax and related penalties is 
three years from the later of the date of filing or the due date of the return. 
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2012). However, there is no statute of limitations for fraudulent or 
unfiled returns. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1)–(3).  
 114 Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322. The FBAR penalties have a six-year statute of 
limitations. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012). Therefore, the only year subject to this penalty 
was 2000. Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322. 
 115 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Williams v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 54, 58 (2008). The Tax Court also concluded that it 
lacks jurisdiction to address any FBAR penalty collection issue. Id. at 59. The Bankruptcy 
Court also lacks jurisdiction over FBAR penalty assessments. United States v. Simonelli, 
614 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246–47 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that the FBAR penalty is not a tax 
penalty and is consequently barred from discharge). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2012) provides 
an avenue in district court for  
[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any 
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or 
collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or 
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected 
under the internal-revenue laws.  
Based on this statute, if the penalty is assessed, it cannot be litigated unless it is paid. 
Thus, it appears that no avenue exists to litigate assessment of a civil FBAR penalty 
without paying it, except to wait for the government to bring a collection suit as in 
Williams II. 
 118 United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-cv-437, 2010 WL 3473311, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 1, 2010). The suit was brought pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2), allowing the 
government to commence a civil action to recover an FBAR penalty within two years of 
assessment. Id. at *1.  
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evidence that Williams knew the contents of his tax return.”119 
The court was not persuaded, emphasizing that “these actions 
occurred after Williams found out that the U.S. and Swiss 
authorities knew about the ALQI accounts.”120 Considering these 
facts, the Court determined that “it clearly follows logically that 
Williams was aware that the authorities knew about the ALQI 
accounts by the fall of 2000, significantly before June 30, 
2001 . . . . [This] strongly indicate[s] . . . that Williams lacked any 
motivation to willfully conceal the accounts from authorities after 
that point.”121 The court concluded that “Williams’ failure to 
disclose already-frozen assets in a foreign account was not an act 
undertaken intentionally or in deliberate disregard for the law, 
but instead constituted an understandable omission given the 
context in which it occurred.”122 The holding strongly suggested 
that “the IRS would have a hard time proving willfulness when a 
taxpayer didn’t know about FBARs. [It also] may have caused 
some with foreign accounts not to step forward.”123 
Unsurprisingly, the government was dissatisfied with this 
holding, and filed an appeal in November 2010.124 Beginning with 
precedent in criminal matters before transitioning to a broader 
definition for civil violations, the court in Williams III gave the 
following overview in an attempt to define willfulness in the 
FBAR context: 
“Willfulness may be proven through inference from conduct meant to 
conceal or mislead sources of income or other financial information,” 
and it “can be inferred from a conscious effort to avoid learning about 
reporting requirements.” United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 
1476 (6th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted) (noting willfulness 
standard in criminal conviction for failure to file an FBAR). Similarly, 
“willful blindness” may be inferred where “a defendant was 
subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of a tax 
liability, and purposefully avoided learning the facts point to such 
liability.” United States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 122 (4th Cir.2011) 
(affirming criminal conviction for willful tax fraud where tax preparer 
‘closed his eyes to’ large accounting discrepancies). Importantly, in 
cases “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, 
[courts] have generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of 
a standard, but reckless ones as well.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. 
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007) 
 
 119 Id. at *4. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at *5. 
 123 Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties Just Got Even Worse, FORBES (July 22, 2012, 
11:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/07/22/fbar-penalties-just-got-eve 
n-worse/. 
 124 United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012). 
Do Not Delete 10/13/2014 5:31 PM 
258 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
(emphasis added). Whether a person has willfully failed to comply 
with a tax reporting requirement is a question of fact. Rykoff v. United 
States, 40 F.3d 305, 307 (9th Cir.1994) . . . .125 
Shortly thereafter, the court stated that “the evidence as a 
whole leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the 
district court clearly erred in finding that Williams did not 
willfully violate § 5314.”126 The court found that Williams’s 
signature is prima facie evidence that he knew what he was 
signing, and “at a minimum line 7a’s directions to ‘[s]ee 
instructions for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD 
F 90-22.1’ put Williams on inquiry notice of the FBAR 
requirement.”127 The court determined that Williams’s lack of 
attention to the contents of his tax return “constitute[d] willful 
blindness to the FBAR requirement.”128 The court was further 
convinced that Williams’s acknowledgement “that he willfully 
failed to report the existence of the ALQI accounts to the IRS or 
Department of the Treasury as part of his larger scheme of tax 
evasion. [This] . . . [wa]s an admission of violating § 5314 . . . .”129 
The court concluded that “at a minimum, Williams’s undisputed 
actions establish reckless conduct, which satisfies the proof 
requirement under § 5314 . . . [and] that the district court clearly 
erred in finding that willfulness had not been established.”130 
The dissent argued that “a reasonable factfinder [may] 
conclude that the violation was willful, as the majority believes. 
But there is also evidence supporting the opposite view.”131 
In December 2012, a Utah district court affirmed the 
precedent set in Williams III, finding that “[f]or an individual to 
act ‘willfully,’ an individual need not have been subjectively 
aware of the FBAR reporting requirement or else an individual 
would be able to defeat liability by deliberately avoiding learning 
of his or her legal duties.”132  
Interestingly, the Court in Williams III applied a 
significantly lower legal standard than the IRS published in its 
 
 125 Id. at 658. 
 126 Id. at 659. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 660.  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 661 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 132 United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1210 (D. Utah 2012). 
Additionally, the District Court cited the overturned decision from Williams II (noting 
that the decision was overturned on other grounds), stating that “in a civil FBAR penalty 
case, . . . the United States’ burden of proof was ‘the preponderance of the evidence’ on all 
questions before the court, including the question of whether the taxpayer’s failure to 
report in that case was ‘willful.’” Id. at 1201. 
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Internal Revenue Manual (hereinafter “IRM”), which requires 
“the person’s knowledge of the [FBAR] reporting requirements 
and the person’s conscious choice not to comply.”133 Although the 
IRM suggests that willful blindness might rise to the level of 
willfulness, the IRS states that “[t]he mere fact that a person 
checked the wrong box, or no box, on a Schedule B is not 
sufficient, by itself, to establish that the FBAR violation was 
attributable to willful blindness.”134 
In addition to this conflicting standard, it has been noted 
that “[g]auging the impact of Williams III on opt out decisions 
will be interesting, yet difficult to quantify . . . . The taxpayer’s 
success in Williams II, followed by the taxpayer’s defeat in 
Williams III, will trigger additional uncertainty for 
taxpayers . . . .”135 Logic dictates that the same uncertainty will 
apply in the context of quiet disclosures.  
The initial success in Williams II was a victory for taxpayers, 
likely encouraging many to avoid the high penalties in the OVD 
programs altogether, and instead take their chances with an 
opt-out or a quiet disclosure. Even though the decision was 
overturned in Williams III, the taxpayer clearly intended to hide 
his assets offshore, and many taxpayers realize that they are 
unlikely to face an FBAR penalty of any kind if their failure to 
report is less egregious. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of 
taxpayers with foreign accounts still have not come forward 
through the OVD programs.136 
IV. 2012 OVDP LEAVES ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Due to the success of the prior programs, the IRS announced 
the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (hereinafter 
“2012 OVDP”).137 Like the 2011 OVDI, the look-back period is 
eight years, however the penalty on the maximum aggregate of 
foreign account balances has been increased to 27.5%, and the 
program is indefinite.138 The IRS makes clear that the program is 
 
 133 Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 62. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 332. 
 136 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 142 (suggesting less than 1% 
have entered the OVD programs). 
 137 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6. 
 138 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64, supra note 8; Lederman, supra note 7, at 517 
(suggesting a risky proposition that the open-ended nature of the 2012 OVDP allows 
taxpayers to strategize with regard to the timing of the voluntary disclosure if the earliest 
year in the look-back period would create a larger amount of tax and penalty than the 
current year). 
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subject to change at any time, including a potential increase in 
penalties or an end to the program altogether.139 
Although the OVD Programs have been widely regarded as 
effective, there is a perception of unfairness as a result of the 
severe across-the-board penalty for failing to report foreign bank 
accounts, regardless of the circumstances.140 Alternatives such as 
opting out or making a quiet disclosure may be the best choice for 
some taxpayers, but the uncertainty surrounding both options, in 
addition to threats imposed by the IRS for utilizing these 
alternatives,141 has forced many to accept the draconian penalties 
imposed by the OVD programs.142 
Although “[t]axpayers may normally correct their own 
inadvertent violations without significant penalties or burdens,” 
the IRS’s threats against quiet disclosures and the opt-out 
alternatives discourage self-correction.143 Rather than face the 
extreme penalties offered through the program, or risk being 
caught making a quiet disclosure, “some taxpayers are likely to 
ignore their problems until the IRS offers them a reasonable way 
to correct inadvertent errors.”144 Collectively, these problems 
have contributed to many taxpayers paying too much under the 
 
 139 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 82, at FAQ 1. 
 140 See Kevin E. Packman, Noncompliance After the IRS Offshore Income Reporting 
Iniative—What Options Remain?, 111 J. TAX’N 281, 283 (2009) (“The Initiative effectively 
eliminated the reasonable cause exception for failure to file the FBAR and assumed that 
all such failures were attributable to the taxpayer’s willfulness.”). 
 141 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 137 (“Because of these threats, 
many taxpayers were concerned that the IRS would always seek the maximum FBAR 
penalties, regardless of the situation.”); see also Gregory J. Bertsch & Benjamin C. 
Hughes, Final FBAR Regulations: Navigating the Complex Requirements of Reporting 
Foreign Bank Accounts, 25 J. TAX’N & REG. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 23, 31 (2011) (“IRS 
examiners are given discretion to mitigate penalties and assess less than the maximum 
amount; however, the recent trend has been for the IRS to pursue willful penalties and 
assess the maximum amount permitted.”). 
 142 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 137 (finding “some benign actors 
were so fearful . . . that they accepted the IRS settlement and paid more than they owed”).  
 143 Id. at 135–36 (“[T]hose who failed to report income could normally avoid 
accuracy-related penalties by filing ‘qualified amended returns’ before being contacted by 
the IRS. Thus, in the absence of any special IRS program, a taxpayer could correct a 
failure to report a foreign account and income from the account while avoiding most 
penalties by simply filing three (or six) years worth of returns (or amended returns) and 
FBARs. This approach encourages voluntary compliance and self-correction, which is the 
IRS’s stated goal.”).  
 144 Id. at 137. An important aspect in assessing the FBAR penalty outside of the OVD 
programs is the fact that taxpayers and practitioners alike were unaware of the reporting 
requirements. However, due to the recent crackdown, the resulting increased awareness 
will raise the likelihood of the existence of willfulness. See Michael Sardar, What 
Constitutes ‘Willfulness’ for Purposes of the FBAR Failure-to-File Penalty?, 113 J. TAX’N 
183, 187 (2010). 
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current one-size-fits-all structure, and the majority of taxpayers 
choosing to remain noncompliant.145 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASED OVD PARTICIPATION AND 
FUTURE COMPLIANCE 
Overall, the recent OVD programs have been effective, but 
there is a lot of room for improvement, as most taxpayers remain 
non-compliant.146 The purpose of any amnesty program should be 
to increase compliance over the long term.147 The few billions 
that have been collected is paltry compared to the purported 
$100 billion annual tax gap resulting from offshore income.148 
Rather than leaving taxpayers with a choice between paying too 
much or remaining noncompliant, the OVD program should be 
greatly expanded to make participation an easy decision, which 
will substantially increase voluntary compliance in the future, 
thereby reducing the annual tax gap significantly.149 
The OVD program should utilize a tiered-penalty structure 
based on the amount of tax owed and the existence of mitigating 
factors, instead of the one-size-fits-all approach currently being 
used.150 Currently, the 2012 OVDP offers options for reduced 
penalties of 5% and 12.5%.151 In addition to an opt-out option,152 
however, the reduced penalties are too narrow for most taxpayers 
entering the program to utilize, and opting out is generally an 
unappealing option as previously discussed in Part II above.153 
 
 145 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 147 n.61 (“[T]he IRS’s current 
approach may be more likely to reduce voluntary compliance and increase tax evasion.”). 
 146 See id. at 142 (“While the OVD programs attracted over 27,000 applications 
(perhaps less than one percent of those who did not file FBARs) and collected almost 
$5.5 billion, a more effective initiative could prompt significantly more taxpayers to come 
into compliance voluntarily.”). 
 147 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 520 (“[R]evenue-raising should not be the primary 
purpose of an amnesty . . . . Instead, bringing taxpayers into compliance should be.”). 
 148 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON 
TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print 2008). Based on the 2006 
estimate, the international tax gap since 2003 is approximately $1 trillion.  
 149 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 153. The program should be 
timed so that simultaneously, the forced compliance elements of FATCA will begin, 
increasing the incentive for taxpayers to comply while it is still voluntary, and reducing 
the risk of wasting IRS resources. 
 150 The National Taxpayer Advocate has suggested a similar approach with three 
tiers. The first tier would provide an avenue to avoid all penalties, including civil 
penalties on the additional income, if the amount due on the amended returns is less than 
the greater of $5000 or 10% of the total tax. The second tier would eliminate the penalty 
on the highest account balance for taxpayers who can show reasonable cause or who acted 
non-willfully. The third tier would allow for anyone else who voluntarily comes forward to 
participate in the program under the current penalty structure. See id. at 150–51. 
 151 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10, at FAQ 52–53. 
 152 Id. at FAQ 51. 
 153 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 232 (2013). 
The opt-out option is unappealing for many due to the risks associated with an audit as 
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Historically speaking, only a small percentage of taxpayers who 
failed to report offshore accounts will ever be assessed with the 
willful penalty, which is generally the only penalty that is higher 
than the penalty assessed through the program. Therefore, the 
IRS should expand all three of these already existing options to 
fit the circumstances of the majority of program participants.154  
The IRS may be experimenting with the idea of providing 
avenues for a reduced penalty with the addition of the 
Streamlined Compliance Program, which occurs outside of the 
OVD program, providing penalty relief for taxpayers who were 
residing outside of the United States, did not file a tax return, 
and had a tax liability below $1500 per year.155 This is an 
excellent approach by the IRS as it signifies their realization that 
one size does not fit all; however, much like the other 
alternatives available, it is far too narrow.156 The alternative 
penalty structures should be capable of being utilized just as 
much as, if not more than, the highest penalty applicable under 
the OVD program. 
In the spirit of fairness, taxpayers who have previously 
participated in an OVD program should be given an opportunity 
to establish cause for a lower penalty based on the new 
parameters and obtain any resulting refund without the 
possibility of higher penalties being imposed.157 In order to 
maximize credibility and increase awareness, the program 
should be given an end date,158 and the IRS should carry out on 
 
well as significantly slower processing times. Id. Unfortunately, to date, the “inflexible 
opt-in-opt-out approach offered bad actors a relatively better deal and also provided them 
with better customer service than benign actors.” Id. at 233. 
 154 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 153. When compared to the 
penalty assessed under the program, “[t]he existing FBAR statute offers . . . taxpayers a 
better deal, capping the maximum penalty at $10,000 per violation if the IRS cannot 
prove the violation was willful and eliminating the penalty altogether if the taxpayer can 
show ‘reasonable cause’ for his or her failure to report the account(s).” Id. at 148. 
 155 See Internal Revenue Serv., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the 
Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures for Non-Resident, Non-Filer Taxpayers, 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/FAQReStreamlinedFilin 
gComplianceProceduresNRNFTPs (last updated Dec. 10, 2013). The $1500 threshold is 
not a requirement, but rather a guideline, as the IRS generally will not consider 
taxpayers with tax below this amount a risk factor. Id. 
 156 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 153, at 231 (“A new ‘streamlined’ 
program is less burdensome, but is overly narrow and does not provide certainty.”).  
 157 The IRS may balk at returning money it previously received under the OVD 
penalty structure; however, if the tiered approach is successful at increasing future 
compliance, any refunds given will be insignificant in relation to the reduction in the 
annual tax gap. 
 158 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 518, 524 (suggesting that the ongoing nature of 
the 2012 OVDP undermines its credibility and effectiveness). 
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their threats against quiet disclosures159 and publicly prosecute 
the most egregious examples of willful behavior.  
Currently, IRS resources are tied up processing voluntary 
disclosures of taxpayers who willingly came forward, leaving few 
resources to pursue willful evaders.160 Expanding the program as 
suggested will significantly increase voluntary compliance and 
will free up valuable IRS resources to pursue taxpayers who are 
purposefully evading taxes through the use of offshore 
accounts.161 This group of tax evaders makes up a significantly 
large portion of lost revenues annually, and should be the 
intended target of IRS enforcement.162 
 
 159 See Morse, supra note 3, at 721 (determining that the lack of public prosecutions 
of serious tax offenders who have made quiet disclosures undermines the IRS’s warnings 
against them). It is clear when comparing the 2003 OVCI to the 2009 OVDP, that the 
concurrent highly-publicized UBS scandal was extremely effective in increased 
participation in the program. However, it appears unlikely that the IRS has the resources 
to carry out their threat. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 135 (noting 
concern that the IRS has “[i]ncreased the cost and burden of correcting past violations, as 
well as the IRS resources required to process these corrections . . . .”). 
 160 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 153, at 233. 
 161 See Gerard Ryle et al., Secret Files Expose Offshore’s Global Impact, in SECRECY 
FOR SALE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE MONEY MAZE 4, 5 (2013), available at 
http://cloudfront-files-1.publicintegrity.org/documents/pdfs/ICIJ%20Secrecy%20for%20Sal 
e.pdf (“[O]ffshore financial secrecy has spread aggressively around the globe, allowing the 
wealthy and the well-connected to dodge taxes . . . .”). 
 162 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 527 (citing Marie Sapirie, New Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative Features 25 Percent Penalty, Greater Clarity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 
9, 2011, at 27-1) (quoting Gregory S. Lynam: “‘While it is great that the IRS is stepping up 
use of all of its enforcement tools, there is a danger that the IRS may focus on the little 
fish that voluntarily swim into the net.’”). 
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Addendum 
September 10, 2014 
 On June 18, 2014, the IRS announced a modification of 
terms to the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program.163 The 
modification includes an expansion to the Streamlined 
Compliance Program to include taxpayers living in the United 
States, taking effect July 1, 2014. Under this modification, 
taxpayers that did not act willfully may qualify for a reduced 
OVD penalty of 5%, and only have to amend three years of tax 
returns.164 In order to qualify, the taxpayer must certify that the 
failure to report all income, pay all tax, and/or submit all 
required information returns, including FBARs, was not 
willful.165 
 This is a significant change to the government’s previous 
hardline approach, and it is completely in line with the 
suggestions proposed in this Article. It appears that this new and 
improved approach may be around for quite some time, which is 
apparently necessary as compliance slowly begins to improve.  
 One major flaw with this new approach is the 
unwillingness of the government to allow taxpayers who 
previously entered the program to seek reimbursement under the 
new parameters.166 Although the government has an efficiency 
interest in abstaining from reviewing previously resolved cases, 
this will likely result in an understandable perception of 
unfairness towards those who came forward immediately to be 
compliant. This is an unfortunate result, as the taxpayers who 
previously entered the OVD programs were the first to come 
forward, and were the most anxious to be in full compliance with 
the government. Arguably, a majority of this group is most 
deserving of paying smaller penalties. 
 In spite of this unfortunate flaw, this new modification is 
an excellent approach to tackling the problems addressed in this 
 
 163 See Internal Revenue Serv., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (last 
updated June 18, 2014). 
 164 See Internal Revenue Serv., Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-
Procedures (last updated Aug. 19, 2014). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See Internal Revenue Serv., Transition Rules: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 
IRS.GOV, FAQ 2, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Transition-
Rules-Frequently-Asked-Questions-FAQs (last updated June 18, 2014) (stating that a 
taxpayer who has already completed an OVD program “will not be eligible”).  
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Article, and should go a long way towards closing the significant 
tax gap resulting from noncompliance in this area. 
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